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ABSTRACT
There is a long-standing literature that recognizes that an efficient solution in correcting a
consumption externality is through applying subsidies and taxes that line up private incentives with
social ones. An equally long-standing literature tackles the appropriate methods of generating the
efficient amount of R&D into goods that only have private consumption effects, e.g. the analysis of
the welfare effects of patent regulations. This paper analyzes the joint problem of the optimal
provision of R&D and consumption incentives for goods that at the same time undergo technological
change and have external consumption effects. For good with external effects, just as is the case for
goods with only private effects, ex-post static efficiency may have to be sacrificed for dynamic
efficiency. For goods with only private consumption effects, it is well-understood that efficient
competition ex-post leads to insufficient R&D incentives ex-ante, which is of course the common
rationale for patents. For external effects, this analogy has the important and unrecognized
implication that classic interventions to solve externality problems, such as Pigouvian taxes and
subsidies, may often be inefficient under technological change. In many cases, arguing for Pigouvian
solutions in presence of technological change is analogous to arguing for competitive markets for
new inventions (!), as both argue for ex-post efficiency rather than dynamic efficiency. The results
are discussed in the context of the pharmaceutical industry which simultaneously is one of the most
R&D-intensive industries and one for which consumption of its output often seems to involve
external effects, e.g. through human rights-based access issues.
Tomas Philipson Stéphane Mechoulan
The Irving B. Harris Graduate School Department of Economics
of Public Policy Studies The University of Toronto
The University of Chicago 150 St. George Street
1155 East 60
th Street Toronto, Ontario M5S3G7
Chicago, IL 60637 Canada
and NBER s.mechoulan@utoronto.ca
t-philipson@uchicago.edu3 
I. Introduction  
 
A  long-standing  literature  discusses  efficient  methods  of  correcting  consumption 
externalities  through  applying  subsidies  and  taxes  that  align  private  with  social 
incentives, as first recognized by Pigou (1932). However, this classic problem assumes 
that there is no technological change in the good that confers the external effects.  
  An equally long-standing literature tackles the appropriate methods of  stimulating 
technological  change  for  goods  that  only  have  private  consumption  effects,  e.g.,  the 
analysis  of  the  welfare  effects  of  patent  regulations.
3 However,  this  classic  problem 
assumes that there are no external effects in the consumption of the good for which there 
is technological change. Although both these problems are well analyzed, the problem of 
dealing with both technological change and external consumption effects remains less 
explored.  
  The lack of a framework for understanding this joint allocation problem seems to 
have  led  to  confusion  and  disagreement  about  appropriate  policy  solutions  for  many 
important issues implicitly involving the problem. This has been particularly true  for 
many policy issues facing the pharmaceutical industry, which is one of the most R&D-
intensive industries and confronted with altruistic or human rights-based access issues. 
For example, consider the case of antibiotic resistance in which there has been great 
pressure  to  limit  usage  in  order  to  slow  down  the  rising  threat  of  many  antibiotics 
becoming useless against many life-threatening diseases. Such negative external effects, 
                                      
3 Of course, there is a vast literature on the external effects of the R&D-process itself rather than on the 
external consumption effects of the final good, see e.g., Jones and Williams (2000). 
 4 
induced by current consumption lowering the value of future consumption,
4 has prompted 
what may be interpreted as Pigouvian-like measures of taxing or limiting the demand for 
antibiotics. However, such classic remedies for externality problems discourage R&D 
into  new  antibiotics  that  will  replace  those  to  which  bacteria  have  become  resistant. 
Therefore, the dynamic costs of limiting the use of antibiotics may dominate the static 
benefits  even  though  such  limits  are  the  appropriate  policy  in  the  absence  of 
technological change.  
  As another example, consider the pressing problem of providing drugs to third world 
nations  for  diseases  such  as  AIDS,  malaria,  or  tuberculosis.  These  nations  have  the 
greatest numbers of people infected with these diseases in the world but cannot afford the 
costs of new drugs.  As it appears that richer, developed countries, whether for selfish or 
altruistic reasons, care about expanding the access to drugs for third-world countries for 
diseases  such  as  AIDS,  this  problem  appears  to  be  one  of  efficiently  providing  both 
technological change and consumption under positive external effects.   
  More generally, as many observers have argued that technological change is the key 
to the continued expansion of the health care sector in the economy,
5 one may also argue 
that the joint allocation problem studied here is perhaps the central allocation problem for 
health care industries more broadly.
6 Because it appears that many developed nations 
have  decided  that  it  is  intolerable  to  let  people  die  or  suffer  when  existing  medical 
                                      
4 For the purpose of this paper, we will assume that these negative external effects dominate the classic 
positive external effects of treatments for infectious diseases, see e.g., Philipson (2000). 
 
5 See e.g., Newhouse (1992). 
 
6 Many other industries appear to have similar issues. For example, industries for which output is used as 
inputs to externality-generating R&D, “research tools” industries, industries with network-, peer-group-, or 
herd-effects,  industries  in  which  production  induces  pollution,  all  seem  to  involve  similar  issues  of 
balancing externalities ex-post with R&D incentives ex ante.  
 5 
technologies  can  prevent  it,  public  financing  often  covers  such  technologies.  Such 
altruistic  adoption  of  new  technologies  ex-post  needs  to  be  balanced  against  the 
technological change it induces. Many Pigouvian-style measures suggested, e.g., through 
so called “cost-effectiveness” criteria in public adoption of new technologies, do not take 
into account the effects on technological change.   
  This paper derives the optimal treatment of externalities and IP when they co-exist. 
First,  we  discuss  the  impact  that  IP  has  on  remedies  aimed  at  solving  externality 
problems.  We  argue  that  classic  Pigouvian  solutions  are  inappropriate  under 
technological change; for goods with external effects, just as for those without, ex-post 
static  efficiency  is  often  inconsistent  with  ex-ante  dynamic  efficiency.  Without 
externalities,  this  is  of  course  the  rationale  for  patents  with  their  associated  ex-post 
inefficiencies.  A  simple,  but  unrecognized,  analogous  implication  under  consumption 
externalities  is  that  Pigouvian  solutions  may  often  be  inefficient  under  technological 
change. In many cases, arguing for Pigouvian solutions in the presence of technological 
change is analogous to arguing for competitive markets for new inventions (!) as both 
argue for ex-post efficiency without regard to dynamic R&D incentives.  
  Second, we discuss the reverse problem of the impact that externalities have on the 
design  of  IP.  Regarding  the  optimal  form  of  IP,  external  effects  influence  whether 
patents,  potentially  capturing  consumer  surplus,  or  prizes,  potentially  capturing  those 
externally  affected  by  consumption,  best  reward  innovation.  When  there  are  positive 
external effects, such as a result of altruism in health care delivery, rewards to innovation 
should not be guided by the potential consumer surplus as it is with patents, but by the 
entire  social  surplus  that  includes  the  benefits  to  those  externally  affected  by 6 
consumption. In the extreme case of third-world diseases, consumers often cannot pay 
above variable cost, which means patents are of little value to innovators.  However, if 
prizes are used, we argue that the way that efficient production and distribution takes 
place under a prize is non-trivial under external effects because free and unrestricted 
licensing  does  not  induce  ex-post  efficiency.  The  competition  induced  by  free  and 
unrestricted licensing after the prize has been awarded does not generate the efficient 
output. Given these shortcomings of the traditional forms of prizes under external effects, 
we analyze alternative prize contracts that may induce better production and distribution 
incentives ex-post. 
  We discuss how externalities not only affect the type of IP selected but also how a 
given individual type of IP, prizes or patents, is efficiently designed in the presence of 
externalities. Optimal patents may be infinite under external effects, and optimal prizes 
will reward the average, as opposed to the marginal, output produced. The discussion has 
strong efficiency implications for using so called “cost-effectiveness” criteria used for 
public technology adoption in health care, as is common in other rich countries and often 
advocated for the U.S. 
  The paper is related to several literatures. It is of course related to the voluminous 
literature  on  the  appropriate  methods  of  treating  externalities  which  is,  in  fact,  too 
voluminous to usefully discuss here (see Laffont, 1987 for a survey). The paper also 
extends work on the optimal forms of push-and-pull stimuli including patents, prizes and 
research contracts (see Nordhaus, 1969 and 1972; Wright, 1983; Kremer and Glennester, 
2004; Scotchmer, 2005). However, previous work has not explicitly addressed the impact 
of external consumption effects.  7 
  The  paper  may  be  briefly  outlined  as  follows.  Section  II  sets  up  the  allocation 
problem of involving externalities under technological change. Section III discusses the 
optimal way of intervening to solve externality  problems given  a certain form of  IP. 
Section IV discusses the reverse problem of how to best design IP given the existence of 
externalities. We first consider the overall choice of prizes versus patents and then their 
individual design. Finally, Section V summarizes our conclusions. 
 
II. External Effects and IP 
 
Let y denote the quantity of output, p(y) denote the private inverse demand curve of 
consumers,  e(y)  the  monetary  value  of  the  external  consumption  effects  to  non-
consumers,  and  c(y)  the  total  cost  function.  Let  the  producer  surplus  (profits)  of  a 
monopolist be denoted: 
  ￿(y) = p(y)y - c(y)            (1) 
and let y￿ denote the assumed unique output that maximizes profits ￿.  The surplus of the 
consumers engaged in consumption is denoted: 
  s(y) = ￿
y
0 [p(q)-p(y)]dq          (2) 
The social welfare W(y) is then defined by consumer and producer surplus together with 
the surplus e(y) of those affected externally by consumption: 
  W(y) = s(y) + ￿(y) + e(y)          (3) 
Let yW denote the assumed unique output that maximizes W.  
  The feasible level of technological change in the good consumed is represented by 
letting x(r) be an increasing, differentiable and strictly concave function representing the 8 
probability of discovering an invention as a function of the level of R&D, r, undertaken.  
The optimal level of R&D that maximizes expected payoffs for any hypothetical ex-post 
prize z is denoted r(z) and is defined by:  
r(z) = argmaxr x(r)z - r           (4) 
We assume that the chance of discovery x(r) is a differentiable, increasing, and concave 
function, which implies that r(z) is an increasing function.  
  An allocation (r,y) is defined as an R&D level, r, together with a series of dated 
outputs,  y  =  (y1,y2,…)  after  the  invention  has  been  discovered.  The  expected  social 
welfare given R&D and output is: 
  D(r,y) = x(r)W(y) - r            (5) 
The  first-best  R&D  and  output  (r
*,y
*)  maximizes  this  social  welfare  and  implies  the 
necessary first-order conditions: 
    Dy = xWy = 0              (6) 
      Dr = xrW - 1 = 0 
  Clearly,  the  first  best  and  ex-post  optimal  output  coincide:  y
*  =  yW.  The 
corresponding first-best  R&D takes into account that highest level of ex-post welfare 
r
* = r(W(yW)). Naturally, as the first-best allocation selects from the unrestricted feasible 
set {(r,y): r³0, y³0} that contains any restricted sets selected from under a second-best 
allocation, the expected welfare is larger in the former case.  
  We will mainly discuss two forms of IP, patents of length t and prizes of size ￿. The 
allocation induced by a patent is a monopoly output yp for t years, and the competitive 
output yc thereafter. Ex-post welfare is: 
  W(t) = v(t)W(yp) + [v(￿) - v(t)]W(yc)      (7) 9 
where v(t) = (1-b
t)/(1-b) is the present value of a claim that pays one dollar a year for t 
years under a discount factor b Î (0,1]. The R&D induced by a patent is that of the 
patented profits r(t) = r(v(t)￿(yp)). A traditional prize with free and unrestricted licensing 
after its award induces an allocation of R&D r(￿) with the competitive output yc every 
year after the invention.   
 
III. The Impact of IP on Externality Interventions  
 
Consider traditional interventions designed to solve the externality consumption problem 
that  aim  to  maximize  ex-post  welfare.  The  output  yW  that  maximizes  annual  ex-post 
welfare W satisfies the necessary first-order condition: 
  Wy = 0    if and only if     p = cy - ey        (8) 
This simply says that the efficient output involves prices above or below marginal costs 
depending on whether the externality is negative or positive. The output level yW may be 
obtained through Pigouvian corrections that align private incentives with social ones. 
  Conditional on a given size of a prize, Pigouvian measures that maximize ex-post 
welfare also maximize dynamic welfare as the R&D undertaken is unaffected by ex-post 
efficiency.  Therefore, if awards are used as methods to stimulate R&D, they impose no 
alterations for classic ex-post measures to handle externalities. 
  Conditional on a given patent length, here for easy exposition assumed infinite in 
length  (similar  arguments  apply  to  any  finite  patent  length),  and  the  output  y,  the 
expected dynamic welfare is: 
     D = x(r(y))aW(y) - r(y)           (9) 10 
where a = v(￿) is the present value of an infinite annuity and where r(y) = r(a￿(y)) is the 
R&D induced by the patented profits.    
  The  Pigouvian  output  generally  does  not  induce  the  first-best  dynamic  allocation 
because the R&D induced by this output equals the first-best R&D level only when: 
  r(a￿(yW)) = r(aW(yW)) = r
*          (10) 
which  implies  s(yW)  +  e(yW)  =  0.  This  never  holds  under  a  positive  externality  and, 
generally, never holds under a negative externality.  
  The Pigouvian output not only fails to induce the first-best allocation, but also fails to 
induce the second-best allocation given that patents are used as a method to stimulate 
R&D. The output yD that maximizes second-best dynamic welfare satisfies the necessary 
first-order condition: 
         ry [xraW -1] + x(aWy) = 0           (11) 
The first term represents the R&D effects of expanding output: the impact of the output 
on R&D times the net social value of that increase in R&D. This R&D effect must be 
balanced  against  the  ex-post  welfare  effects  of  expansion    The  dynamically  optimal 
output  yD  only  corresponds  to  the  ex-post  efficient  solution  to  the  externality 
consumption problem, yW, when the first term is zero. This is true when there is no under 
or over-investment in R&D socially. Such under or over-investment in R&D occurs when 
private rewards to R&D do not reflect social ones, in which case Pigouvian solutions are 
not optimal; W ¹ ￿ implies Wy ¹ 0.  
  This implication for our case of external effects, i.e., that ex-post static efficiency 
through Pigouvian measures is inconsistent with ex-ante dynamic efficiency, is analogous 
to the case of goods with only private consumption effects. Without externalities, it is 11 
well understood that efficient competition ex-post leads to insufficient R&D incentives 
ex-ante, which is of course the common rationale for patents. With externalities, this has 
the  important  and  unrecognized  implication  that  Pigouvian  corrections  may  often  be 
inefficient under technological change. In many cases, arguing for Pigouvian solutions in 
the presence of technological change is analogous to arguing for competitive markets for 
new inventions (!) because both argue for ex-post efficiency without regards to R&D 
incentives. 
  It is important to recognize that the failure of Pigouvian solutions is not necessarily 
due to the fact that patents are second-best methods of stimulating R&D. To illustrate, 
consider when full-price discrimination among consumers is feasible by patent holders so 
that in the absence of externalities, the patent above would induce a first–best allocation 
since social surplus would coincide with producer surplus under an optimally infinite 
patent in that case. However, even under first-degree price discrimination, patents are 
never first-best when there is an externality. This is because price discrimination among 
the consumers of the product sold only allows the firm to capture a consumer surplus, but 
not a surplus derived from external effects. This implies that under a positive externality, 
the monopolist always under-invests in R&D because the consumer surplus captured, 
even though completely captured, is less than the social surplus. Conversely, when the 
externality  is  negative,  the  producer  may  over-invest  in  R&D.  The  problem  is  that 




A. Dynamic Profit Corrections to Static Pigouvian Measures     
The analysis above implies that previous remedies of externalities that consider only the 
static effects on welfare, W, may  be incomplete. This occurs if dynamic welfare, D, 
changes in the opposite direction of static welfare as the remedy affects R&D incentives. 
Remedies  may  lower  welfare  ex-post  but  raise  dynamic  welfare  when  profits  rise  to 
encourage R&D. In general, the static analysis only concerns total ex-post welfare, as 
opposed to dynamic welfare that depends on the incidence of Pigouvian taxation, i.e., on 
how distributional impact affects producers and consumers separately. 
  Consider changing the surplus levels p of the producer and n = s + e of the non-
producer surplus from an initial level (n,p) to the alternative levels (n
’,p
’) due to a remedy 
that  aims  to  correct  an  externality.  As  static  welfare  consists  of  the  sum  of  the  two 
surpluses, W = n + p, there is a one-to-one tradeoff between producer surplus and non-
producer surplus in affecting static welfare. However, the tradeoff between the two in 
keeping dynamic welfare constant satisfies  
  dn/dp = –Dp/Dn = – 1 – (1/x) {rt[xrW – 1] }.     (12) 
The first term, –1, is the tradeoff between consumer and producer surplus keeping ex-post 
welfare constant. However, this tradeoff is tilted towards producer surplus when R&D is 
affected by the incidence of the welfare change. Intuitively, the tradeoff is tilted towards 
profitability by a factor representing the marginal social value of the R&D generated by 
the profits, rt[xrW – 1], discounted by the chance of their occurring, (1/x).  Even with 
other models of the R&D process, the general point remains that the tradeoff will be 
influenced by how much profits affect R&D.  13 
  Figure  1  depicts  what  determines  the  direction  of  the  change  in  dynamic  welfare 
resulting  from  a  change  in  producer  and  non-producer  surplus  due  to  an  externality 
remedy  away  from  initial  levels  (n,p).  The  straight  line  represents  combinations  of 
surpluses that keep classic ex-post welfare the same and thus has a unit slope. The curve 
depicts the combinations that keep dynamic welfare constant when profit changes affect 
R&D.  
 
Figure 1: Static vs Dynamic Impact of a Pigouvian Remedy  
 
When  an  externality  remedy  has  the  same  effect  on  both  producer  and  non-producer 
surplus (n and p both fall or rise), then clearly dynamic welfare is changed in the same 
direction as classic ex-post welfare. In the figure, both static and dynamic welfare are 
higher in the first and fourth quadrant around the initial surplus levels (n,p). When non-











Iso-Dynamic Welfare 14 
deemed inefficient by classic analysis, but may be dynamically efficient. This would be 
true for the new levels of surpluses in region A in the figure. Conversely, when ex-post 
non-producer surplus rises more than profits fall by the remedy, this would be considered 
efficient by classical analysis, but it may be dynamically inefficient.  This would be true 
for  new  levels  in  region  B  in  the  figure.    The  figure  illustrates  not  only  that  classic 
Pigouvian welfare calculations can produce quantitatively incorrect results, but also that 
their  qualitative  conclusions  may  be  inaccurate;  the  sign  of  the  static  and  dynamic 
welfare impacts may differ. This occurs only if Pigouvian remedies affect profitability 
and classic ex-post welfare differentially.  In that case, ex-post profits can be raised to 
overturn a given reduction in classic welfare, or profits can be reduced to overturn a gain 
in classic welfare. 
  The  previous  discussion  considered  the  optimal  choice  among  two  potential 
alternatives. To characterize the choice among all feasible alternatives, consider selecting 
surplus levels from a convex and well-behaved set C induced by a remedy w as in  
  C = { (n,p)  | (n,p) = (n(w),p(w)),   w ￿ W }.       (13) 
This set would make up a utility-possibility frontier in Figure 1 from which surpluses 
could  be  selected.    Static  and  dynamic  welfare  displayed  a  difference  in  tradeoffs 
between profits and non-producer surplus. This has the direct implication that, as long as 
the  choice  set  concerns  positive  utility  imputations,  and  C  is  a  subset  of  R+  ×  R+, 
profitability  will  be  higher  under  dynamic  welfare  than  under  static  welfare.  More 15 
precisely, it can be shown
7 that if (nW,￿W) maximizes W and (nD,￿D) maximizes D then it 
must be that ￿D ￿￿W ￿0 and nW ￿nD ￿0. 
  Because expected profits equal x(r(￿))￿-r(￿), the envelope theorem directly implies 
that  expected  profits  rise  with  ex-post  profits.  This  in  turn  implies  that  maximizing 
dynamic welfare does not only induce higher ex-post profits but also higher expected 
profits than when maximizing static welfare.  In sum, dynamic welfare involves a profit 
correction,  whether  to  static  or  expected  profits,  to  standard  Pigouvian  remedies  that 
reflect the impact of the remedies on technological change
8. 
  An  example  of  the  difference  in  ex-post  and  ex-ante  efficiency  concerns  the 
temptation of governments to force R&D-returns down after an important innovation has 
been discovered when altruism dictates full adoption. For example, many observers have 
argued that a major barrier to R&D investments in an AIDS vaccine is that developers 
realize that if they are successful, governments will mandate full distribution of their 
products at below monopoly markups because it would be viewed inhumane not to. Such 
policies would be efficient ex-post as the developer would lose less than consumers and 
altruists gained ex-post. However, such government theft of R&D would of course not be 
dynamically efficient as no vaccine would be developed anticipating the response. In fact, 
                                      
7 To show this, assume the contrary, that is ￿W >￿D. By definition, we have that nW + ￿W ￿ nD + ￿D. Those 
two inequalities imply that both R&D and ex-post welfare are higher under (nW,￿W) than under (nD,￿D). 
However, since we assume nW, nD ￿0, we must have WD ￿￿D so that R&D is under-provided. Thus, there is 
a contradiction to the dynamic optimality of (nD,￿D).  
 
8 An  open  question  is  whether  the  political  process  favors  reduced  profits  and  short-term  Pigouvian 
solutions over dynamically efficient ones under technological change. 16 
because rich altruists, rather than poor consumers, make up the majority of the surplus 
from such an innovation, the foregone R&D would be larger than under no externalities. 
 
IV. The Impact of External Effects on IP Interventions 
 
The  previous  section  discussed  the  optimal  way  of  intervening  to  solve  externality 
problems given a certain form of IP. This section discusses the reverse problem of how to 
best design IP given the existence of externalities. We first consider the overall choice of 
IP in terms of prizes versus patents and then their individual design.  
 
A. The Optimal Form of IP  
The dynamic welfare under a patent of length ￿ is: 
    D(t) = x(r(t))W(t) – r(t)          (14) 
Here, R&D is induced by patented profits, and ex-post welfare is induced by the output 
over time generated by the patent: 
  r(t) = r(v(t)￿(yp))            (15) 
  W(t) = v(t)W(yp) + [a – v(t)]W(yc)        (16) 
The dynamic welfare under a prize of size ￿ is: 
    D(￿)=x(r(￿))W(￿) – r(￿)          (17) 
Here, R&D is simply that induced by the prize r(￿) and ex-post welfare as the present 
value of welfare induced by the constant output y(￿) after the prize has been awarded 
W(￿)=aW(y(￿)). 
 17 
Prizes vs. Patents with no Externalities 
Without  externalities,  the  optimal  prize  always  dominates  the  optimal  patent, 
D(t
*) ￿ D(￿
*). The optimal prize is the present value of the social surplus ￿
* = aW(yc) and 
thus implements the first-best allocation (r
*,y
*). Without externalities, the optimal patent 
is  always  second-best  and  is  thus  dominated  by  such  a  prize.
9 This  is  sometimes 
interpreted to mean that prizes dominate patents when there are no externalities, with the 
implicit assumption that the organizations selecting the prizes, whether private or public, 
can set them correctly to represent social surplus. This is an assumption that many times 
may be unwarranted. 
  Although  not  previously  recognized,  this  dominance  of  prizes  under  no  external 
effects depends crucially on how production and distribution take place after the prize 
has been awarded. The implicit assumption of the method of production and distribution 
under a prize is that of free and unrestricted licensing of the patent after the discovery, 
hence  generating  the  competitive  output  level:  y(￿)  =  yc.  Thus  prizes  induce  ex-post 
efficiency without externalities, y(￿) = yW, which is the major reason for their superiority 
over patents. However, under external effects, prizes with free licensing still induce a 
competitive level of output, but now this level is inefficient: y(￿) = yc ￿ yW. For example, 
if antibiotics are to be limited in their use, then competitive markets generate too much 
usage. Efficient ex-post production and distribution under a prize, while trivial through 
free licensing in the case of no externalities, is a non-trivial issue when externalities exist. 
 
 
                                      
9 The exception is when the patent monopolists fully capture social surplus through price discrimination, in 
which case the optimal prize and optimal patent (infinite in length) yield the same dynamic welfare. 18 
Prizes vs. Patents with Externalities  
The inefficient ex-post production under a prize with free licensing implies patents may 
dominate prizes under external effects. More precisely, we have the asymmetric result 
that,
10  
  If e ￿ 0 then D(t*) < D(￿*)          (18)     
  If e < 0 then D(t*) ￿ D(￿*) 
The result may be interpreted to state that prizes tend to be more favored over patents the 
more positive the external effects are. The intuition behind this result is that the markup 
of  a  patent  holder  acts  as  a  Pigouvian  tax  on  ex-post  output  under  negative  external 
effects.  More  precisely,  under  negative  external  effects,  ex-post  efficiency  involves  a 
markup of p = cy - ey while the patent involves a markup p = [1/(1+￿)]cy, where ￿ is the 
elasticity of demand.  This “patent-taxation” of externalities implies that the traditional 
welfare loss associated with patents, induced by monopoly markups, is reduced under 
negative  externalities  but  is  exaggerated  under  positive  externalities.  For  a  negative 
externality, the relative size of the elasticity of demand and the harm induced by the 
externality determine whether the patent monopolist under- or over-prices his output. Of 
course, under positive external effects, ex-post efficiency under the prize is higher than 
for patents so that prizes always dominate.   
  The case of third-world disease R&D is useful to consider as an illustration of this 
general  dominance  of  prizes  over  patents  under  positive  external  effects,  even  under 
                                      
10 This can be shown formally by noting that under positive external effects: W(yp) < W(yc) < W(yW). Ex-
post welfare is thus higher under the prize than under the patent. The optimal prize ￿
*=aW(yc) induces 
more of the under-provided R&D than any patent. Under negative external effects, the reverse inequality 
W(yc) < W(yp) < W(yW) may be obtained. The optimal prize size is still ￿
* = aW(yc), which may induce 
less of the under-provided R&D whenever patented profits exceed the prize: v(t)￿(yp)) ￿ ￿*.  
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conditions when patents are first best under no externalities. For diseases present only in 
poor countries, consider when social surplus mainly consists of the external altruistic 
effects  of  developed  nations  and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  of  the  consumer  surplus  in 
developing nations. More precisely, consider when the inverse demand curve is below 
marginal costs, p < cy, because consumers are too poor to be able to pay variable costs of 
production, let alone the fixed costs of R&D. This implies that the patented monopoly 
power  does  not  confer  any  profits  and  thus  implies  no  R&D  spending  and  dynamic 
welfare: ￿ = r = D = 0 for all patents of length ￿.  Prizes dominate patents here because 
the patent holder can only capture consumer surplus, but when consumers cannot pay 
variable costs, there is only non-consumer surplus contributing to welfare. Note that this 
dominance has little to do with the second-best nature of patents because even when they 
are first-best, as when the monopolist is allowed to fully price discriminate, they are still 
dominated by prizes. Rather, the problem with patents under altruism is that the output is 
not sold to those willing to pay for it.  
  Moreover, when the inverse demand curve is below marginal costs, the importance of 
the  method  of  production  and  distribution  under  a  prize  is  quite  drastic  under  such 
positive external effects. Under the standard mechanism for generating output associated 
with a prize, i.e., free licensing, patents always dominate any  positive (and hence non-
optimal) prize. This is because the R&D would be undertaken without distribution for 
any positive prize. However, under a patent, the R&D would not occur. This is a relevant 
issue for third-world disease R&D where a lack of profit motive for the distribution of 
existing innovations often seems of equal importance for the discovery of new ones. In 20 
general, excessive government funding for innovations that do not pass a market test also 
falls into this case. 
 
B. Optimal Prizes under External Effects 
The way that production and distribution take place under a prize is non-trivial under 
external  effects  because  free  and  unrestricted  licensing  does  not  induce  ex-post 
efficiency. Given these shortcomings of the traditional forms of prizes under external 
effects, this section analyzes alternative prize contracts that may induce better production 
incentives ex-post.   
   
Public Price Guarantees  
Consider  a  public  price-guarantee  contract  represented  by  a  price  level  at  which  the 
public sector promises to purchase a given product if it is discovered. This makes the 
monopolist face a price that does not change with output. If we let y(p) be the supply at a 
given fixed price p, then the profits under a given price-guarantee contract will be: 
  ￿(p) = py(p) - c(y(p))  (19) 
The price guarantee contract implements the first-best allocation if: 
    y(p) = y
*  and  r(￿(p)) = r
*          (20) 
As the monopolist is faced with a “competitive” price that does not change with output, 
the optimal price that implements the first best allocation is the Pigouvian price 
  p = cy - ey.                (21) 
  It follows that the R&D investment is first-best only if ￿(p)=W(y(p)) which does not 
hold generically. A guaranteed price will not implement the first-best allocation because 21 
two conditions on the single optimal purchasing price are required, one implied by the 
cost  structure  or  supply  curve  of  the  firm  and  the  other  by  the  size  of  the  surplus 
generated by external effects and consumption. An illustrative special case is when there 
are constant returns to scale in production, in which case output will be infinite when the 
price is above marginal costs, but there will be no R&D if prices are at or below marginal 
costs. The two conditions imposed by a price guarantee cannot be met simultaneously for 
generic cases of preferences and technology. A single measure is unlikely to solve the 
two aspects of the allocation problem, and thus price guarantee contracts are unlikely to 
implement first-best allocations.   
 
Public Demand Contracts  
Consider an award that consists of a committed public demand contract represented by 
the quantity and price (y,p), e.g., 100 million doses of a vaccine at the price of $10 per 
shot.  What does such a first-best purchasing contract (y
*,p
*) look like? 
  Clearly, the output level of the contract must equal the first-best level: 
  y
* = yW              (22) 
To  examine  what  price  induces  the  first-best  level  of  R&D,  let  the  ex-post  profits 
obtained under the contract be denoted: 
    ￿(y,p) = py - c(y)            (23) 
The contract yields the correct amount of R&D whenever: 
  r(￿(yW,p)) = r(W(yW))           (24) 
This implies that the optimal contract price is: 
    p
* = c(yW)/yW + W(yW)/yW = [so(yW) + e(yW)] / yW     (25) 22 
where so = ￿p(q)dq is the aggregate consumer surplus when the good is given out free of 
charge under the public program. The optimal contract price is determined by the average 
social value of output which differs from the ex-post efficient Pigouvian price determined 
by the marginal social value of output: p = cy - ey. As the monopolist faces the social 
costs but not the social benefit of the production, only the revenue side of the producer 
tradeoffs has to be adjusted to have the R&D reflect the social benefit of the activity.  In 
the special case of no externalities, the optimal price is simply the average consumer 
surplus under the Pigouvian output level, p
* = so(yW)/yW equating profits with ex-post 
welfare.  
   The  optimal  purchasing  contract  illustrates  the  more  general  point  that  optimal 
pricing  of  external  effects  ex-post  is  not  appropriate  for  optimal  R&D  incentives  ex-
ante.
11  This may be exemplified by the case of constant returns: when the product is free, 
the consumer surplus satisfies so(y) = ay - by
2/ 2 so that the optimal purchasing contract 
satisfies: 
  y
* = yW = (a - c + e)/ b          (26) 
    p
* = [so(yW) + e(yW)]/ yW = a - (b/2)yW + e = (a + c + e)/ 2. 
Note that the optimal Pigouvian price p = c - e falls with the externality; as there are 
more benefits to non-consumers on the margin, more consumption should take place. 
This is in contrast to the optimal contract price that rises with the externality because the 
price needs to reflect average consumer surplus to encourage innovation correctly.    
                                      
11 This simple result contrasts many alternative discussions of what sufficient R&D incentives should be for 
drugs in developing world nations; see, e.g., Lanjouw (2002) or Sachs (2001). Many discussions argue they 
should be comparable with returns on drugs demanded by developed countries while the preferences or 
technology implying this claim is left unspecified. However, if such alternative investments reflect the 
share of consumer surplus captured by inventors in rich markets, they have no impact on optimal contract 
design as discussed here.   
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  Note that if the revenue received by the innovator under such a contract was simply 
awarded as a prize of size ￿ = p
*y
* = [so(yW) + e(yW)], then the first-best allocation would 
not be obtained because after the reward was received there would be no incentive for 
production  and  distribution.  Public  price  guarantees  or  demand  contracts  generate  an 
incentive for production and distribution in the absence of innovation prizes.
12  
 
Public Technology Adoption Criteria in Health Care   
The previous types of contracts specified price or quantity explicitly for a particular type 
of  innovation.  Other  methods  of  awarding  innovation  through  public  demand  would 
entail  specifying  the  prize  implicitly  through  a  general  decision  rule  that  determines 
public technology adoption.   
  For public technology adoption in health care, many developed countries, though not 
the  U.S.,  make  use  of  some  form  of  “cost-benefit”  or  “cost-effectiveness”  criteria 
determining  whether  governments  adopt  and  pay  for  new  health  care  technology. 
Although there are many forms of such criteria developed for public purchasing decisions 
in the absence of private market signals (see, e.g., Weinstein, 1995; Johanneson, 1996; or 
Gold et al., 1996), the basic goal of such criteria is to determine whether increased-health 
care spending through new technology adoption is justified by its health benefits to a 
population that may or may not be able to pay for those benefits.  These criteria have not 
been related to standard economic  efficiency  generally, and efficiency  under external 
consumption effects in particular.  
                                      
12 The  efficient  separation  between  R&D  and  production,  as  commonly  solved  by  licensing,  is  not 
discussed here but needs to be better understood.  For third-world drugs, innovative companies may be 
rewarded for their R&D after which generic manufacturers may produce and deliver.  24 
  One form of technology adoption criteria involves a public purchase only if consumer 
valuations  are  higher  than  spending,  that  is,  if  s  >  0.    In  a  private  market  under 
competitive conditions, this implies consumer valuations higher than costs of production: 
s(yc) > 0.  In estimating the cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness of an innovation one thus 
needs  an  estimate  of  demand  and  spending.
13 In  a  private  market  without  public  or 
private insurance, e.g., elective surgery procedures, a new technology being estimated to 
be cost-effective in this sense would of course be the expected outcome as it is a direct 
consequence of consumers buying only at a price below their valuations.  Although this 
expected outcome has to be qualified by the presence of private or public insurance, it is 
supported by a large existing and growing empirical health economics literature on the 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness of recent innovations (see Weinstein, 1995; Cutler and 
McClellan, 2001).  
  Now consider the technology adoption criterion induced by cost-effectiveness defined 
as the public sector adopting the new technology at price p for which the benefits to all 
patients in the public program, whether they can pay or not in a private market, are larger 
than spending: so(y)> py. The public sector could either specify such a price or it could be 
implied by optimal private monopoly pricing given the existence of the adoption rule. 
Given the adoption rule, the patent holder would choose a price p = so(y)/ y given the 
infinite elasticity of demand when raising the price above that level.   
  This  rule  for  public  technology  adoption  is  unlikely  to  be  ex-post  efficient  or 
dynamically  efficient  under  external  consumption  effects.    It  is  not  ex-post  efficient 
                                      
13 However, as opposed to estimating demand directly through price changes, which would incorporate 
both  observable  and  unobservable  dimensions  of  the  surplus  s,  common  forms  of  cost-effectiveness 
analysis typically attempt to estimate the consumer surplus indirectly through monetizing observable health 
benefits in various ways. A common method is to apply value of life- or contingent valuation estimates to 
health improvements implied by mortality- or morbidity reductions. 25 
because it is not Pigouvian; it does not reflect the marginal social costs and benefits when 
non-consumer surplus is present. Under altruistic motives for health care provision, the 
ex-post optimal technology adopts when s + e > c rather than when s > 0.  This is simply 
the discrete and infra-marginal version of a Pigouvian policy for the decision to adopt/ 
not-adopt a given technology.  Although the average consumer surplus determines the 
price, it is not dynamically efficient because the average non-consumer surplus is not 
incorporated as we derived would be the case under a dynamically first-best policy.   
  In sum, if taxed-financed technology adoption reflects non-consumer surplus, then it 
should not be based on common cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness criteria induced by 
private markets, but be more lenient towards adoption. The close to universal adoption of 
new health care technology by many governments in richer nations, as exemplified by 
CMS in the U.S., may be efficient. In a sense, because we would expect private markets 
to adopt so called cost-effective treatments by themselves, as in the elective surgery case, 
consumer surplus comparisons with spending is the correct public decision criterion only 
when there is no role for public financing!  
 
C. Optimal Patents under External Effects  
When patents are optimal to use, how do external effects affect their design? The patent 
length that maximizes dynamic welfare D solves: 
  Max D(t)=x(r(t))W(t) - r(t)         (27) 
This yields the necessary first-order condition for the optimal patent length: 
  rt[xrW - 1] = x(-Wt)            (28) 26 
The  left-hand  side  is  the  marginal  benefit  of  extending  a  patent  by  one  year.  It  is 
comprised of the marginal impact on R&D the extension has times the net social value of 
the increase in R&D. The marginal benefit is positive whenever there is under-investment 
in R&D. The right hand side is the marginal cost of extending the patent, which is made 
up of the expected increase in the welfare loss of a patent monopoly. 
  The impact of external effects on patents is thus a result of their changes on the 
marginal costs and benefits of patent extension. Consider first the marginal cost of the 
patent extension related to its impact on ex-post welfare: 
  Wt = vt[W(yp)-W(yc)]           (29) 
When there are no externalities, this derivative is of course negative as it represents the 
deadweight loss of a patented monopolist; a patent extension reduces ex-post welfare by 
simply extending monopoly protection.   
  How do externalities affect the ex-post welfare change induced by a patent, and thus 
the marginal cost of patent extension? The markup of a patent holder acts as a Pigouvian 
tax and, therefore, a patent may be beneficial for ex-post efficiency under a negative 
externality,  such  as  the  antibiotic  case.  However,  it  is  harmful  for  ex-post  efficiency 
under a positive externality, such as the AIDS drug case.  In other words, the traditional 
welfare loss associated with patents may not be present under negative externalities but is 
exaggerated under positive externalities.
14 Indeed, in the case of negative external effects, 
the ex-post welfare function may well rise in patent length, Wt >0, which would imply 
the corner solution of an optimally infinite patent.   
                                      
14 As the patent holder marks up according to p=cy/ (1+￿) and the social optimal price markup is 
p = cy  –  ey,  the  relative  size  of  the  elasticity  of  demand,  e,  and  the  sign  of  the  externality 
determines whether the marginal cost of patent extension is reduced or raised by external effects. 27 
  How  is  the  marginal  benefit  of  patent  extension  affected  by  externalities?    The 
amount of R&D induced by a given patent length is r(t) = r(v(t)p(yp)). Naturally, this 
implies R&D rises in the length of protection: rt >0.  External effects do not have an 
impact  on  this  effect;  a  patent  extension  raises  R&D  equally  much  regardless of  the 
externality.  The second factor in the marginal benefit of patent extension is the net social 
benefit of the additional R&D the patent extension induces, xrW - 1. External effects 
have an indeterminate effect on this net gain in R&D due to the nature of its under-
investment. 
  As an illustration, consider the case of constant returns in which the cost-function is 
of the form c(y) = cy, the externality of the form e(y)=ey, and in which demand is linear 
as in p(y) = a - by.  If  t(e) denotes the optimal patent length given the externality, the 
implicit function theorem applied to the first-order condition of the optimal patent length 
F(t,e) = dD/dt = 0 yields:  
  dt/de = Fe/ (-Ft) = [rtxrWe+xWte]/ (-Ft)      (30) 
Here, the denominator is necessarily positive as long as the second-order condition holds. 
This expression was obtained by using the fact that the optimal R&D level does not 
depend  on  the  size  of  the  externality  as  the  patented  profits  do  not  depend  on  the 
externality: re = 0. As a consequence, the optimal chance of discovery does not depend on 
the externality: xe = xre = 0. 
  Evaluating  the  sign  of  dt/de,  note  that  ex-post  welfare  rises  with  the  externality 
simply because the more people enjoy the output, the larger the externality is We >0. 
Thus, the first term is positive.  Regarding the remaining second term, which depends on 
the sign of Wte, we need to sign the impact the externality has on the marginal effect of 28 
raising the patent length. If the externality is positive, we know that extending the patent 
is harmful, Wt < 0. Furthermore, the larger the size of the positive externality the more 
harmful it is to extend the patent: 
Wte = vt  d[W(yC)-W(yp)]/de  < 0  
Under such an externality, it therefore follows that raising the size of the externality has 
an indeterminate effect on the optimal patent length. A larger positive externality not only 
raises the social value of the invention, We >0, but also increases the harm imposed by 
restricting its consumption through patents, Wte<0, making up two offsetting forces on 
the optimal patent life. In sum, for a positive externality (e>0) or a private good (e=0), it 
is ambiguous whether a rise in the externality should involve a shorter or longer patent: 
dt/de ￿ 0.  If the externality is negative, an analogous argument applies.   
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper considers how dealing with externalities is affected by common forms of IP as 
well as the reverse problem of how IP design is affected by externalities. For the first 
problem of the effect of IP on externality remedies, we stress that although traditional 
Pigouvian  measures  are  efficient  ex-post,  they  do  not  generate  the  correct  R&D-
incentives ex-ante. Thus, arguing in  favor of Pigouvian solutions under technological 
change is incorrect, just as is arguing in favor of competitive markets for new inventions 
in  the  absence  of  externalities.  For  the  second  problem  of  optimal  IP  design  in  the 
presence of externalities, we discuss the optimal form of IP in terms of patents or prizes, 
as well as the design of each particular form. Our analysis is illustrated through health 
care markets, in which altruism often seems to induce public subsidization of the poor or 29 
frail, and in which technological change is so often thought to be a key determinant in the 
expansion of the relative size of this sector.  
  An important area of research suggested but not fully explored by the  discussion 
above points to more elaborate evaluations of proposals to stimulate R&D into many 
prevalent  third-world  diseases.  Without  externalities,  its  seems  efficient  that  a 
disproportionate low share of the world R&D spending on  drugs is allocated to third-
world diseases even though these diseases may be more prevalent and medically harmful 
world-wide. Altruism by richer nations makes it an externality and a policy problem. 
However, existing policy proposals to deal with this implicit externality problem have 
been ad hoc in the sense that it is not clear which allocation problems are underlying the 
proposed  solutions.    Examples  include  Sachs  et  al.  (2001)  who  advocate  cost-based 
pricing financed by donor countries or Lanjouw (2002) who advocates cost-based pricing 
through competition rather than regulation, through country- and disease-specific cut-
backs in IP rights.
15 One may suspect a basic conflict between these policy proposals and 
an efficient provision of R&D under altruism as they reduce the benefits to innovators 
when those benefits should be increased rather than decreased to reflect the value to non-
consumers.    For  exclusively  third-world  diseases,  where  demand  curves  are  below 
variable costs, efficient R&D is done for the rich countries, not for the poor! In a sense, 
many proposals inefficiently involve demanding firm owners not only to pay for R&D to 
discover new drugs, but also to cover the bill for the distribution and consumption to 
fulfill the altruistic desires of the tax base.  
                                      
15 In a more general context, Grossman and Lai (2002) discuss the optimality of streamlining IP protection 
across countries. 30 
  Related to this problem, the provision of AIDS drugs in poor countries mimics the 
problem of providing drugs for rare diseases in the U.S., as well as against agents of bio-
terror,
16 and  it  seems  that  international  lessons  can  be  learned  from  this  domestic 
experience. With the purpose of stimulating R&D into disease classes too rare to generate 
R&D, the U.S. Orphan Drug Act of 1983 both reduced the cost and raised the benefit of 
R&D for such rare diseases.
17 If a society cares about those who are unlucky enough to 
catch uncommon diseases, the social surplus is larger than the consumer surplus. The 
Orphan  Drug  Act  encourages  R&D  to  reflect  altruism,  as  opposed  to  international 
proposals for developing world diseases that discourage R&D in spite of such altruism. 
The enormous growth in drugs for rare diseases generated by the Orphan Drug Act may 
contain important lessons for a better international policy.  
  Lastly, the important issue of how world R&D should be financed across countries 
seems to fall under the discussed allocation problem.  Many discussions of whether the 
U.S. is carrying too large a load of financing world drug R&D centers on the fact that 
about half of world sales are obtained in the unregulated markets of the U.S., with other 
price-regulated  markets  free-riding  on  the  R&D  investments  this  yields.
18 The  non-
exclusivity induced by the free flow of innovations across countries, and the desire to free 
ride due to that non-exclusivity, entails a classic externality or public goods problem in 
the consumption ex-post, with the additional feature of involving technological change.       
                                      
16 In the US, the legislation BioShield authorized $5.6 billion over 10 years for the government to purchase 
vaccines and drugs to fight anthrax, smallpox and other potential agents of bio-terror. 
 
17 For a description of the main features of the act, see www.fda.gov/orphan. Also see Grabowski (2003) 
for a related but independent discussion. 
 
18 Becker et al. (2005) discuss the impact the sharing of the benefits of medical R&D across rich and poor 
countries has had on reducing world inequality.   
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  In general, future research may fruitfully address the design of optimal externality 
and  IP  measures  in  health  care  and  other  areas.  The  analysis  suggests  that  single 
measures aimed at solving the external consumption or private R&D problem alone often 
fall short. In order to achieve first-best allocation, one needs to break the link between ex-
ante  R&D  and  ex-post  output  provision.
19 A  single  instrument  is  not  sufficient  to 
appropriately control both R&D incentives ex-ante and externalities ex-post. Appropriate 





                                      
19 In this paper, we do not discuss whether public versus private production and financing of R&D would 
come closer to implementing the “ideal” first-best policy, in particular how asymmetric information affects 
the optimality of such choice (see Wright, 1983).   32 
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